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 OPINION∗  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Daniel Thomas Carnevale appeals the order of the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Although the Commonwealth mustered scant evidence of his 
guilt at trial, Carnevale presents no basis under federal law to accord him habeas relief.  
We will therefore affirm. 
I. Background 
Carnevale was convicted in Pennsylvania state court in 2007 of three counts of 
murder, one count of aggravated assault, one count of burglary, and one count of arson.  
All those charges stemmed from a 1993 fire at the Columbia House Apartments in the 
                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Bloomfield neighborhood of Pittsburgh, which resulted in three deaths and severe burns 
and injuries to a fourth victim.   
The investigation immediately following the fire did not lead to an arrest, though 
law enforcement officers did look into Carnevale’s potential involvement.  Shane Evans, 
who knew Carnevale because they had both grown up in the neighborhood, told 
investigators that, shortly before the fire, he saw Carnevale near the door to the basement 
of the Columbia apartments, which is where the fire began.  The police interviewed 
Carnevale, and he admitted that he supported himself largely by stealing checks from the 
mailboxes in the Columbia apartments’ courtyard, but he denied involvement in the fire.  
After that interview, Carnevale stole a car and drove it to California, where he was 
arrested.  He called the Pittsburgh police to tell them his whereabouts, and they told him 
that they would contact him if they planned to extradite him – but they did not do so in 
1993, nor in the next dozen years.   
In 2005, however, the cold case unit of the Pittsburgh Police Department’s 
Homicide Unit re-opened the case on the Columbia fire.  After the police published 
stories about the fire in a local newspaper, Evans came forward again to provide his 
account of seeing Carnevale near the apartment building on the night of the fire.  Based 
on that account and the original case file, the police had Carnevale arrested in California 
in August 2006.  Carnevale admitted to his drug abuse a nd check theft in 1993, but he 
continued to deny any involvement in the fire.   
With just that evidence in hand – no more than the Commonwealth had in 1993 
when it declined to prosecute or even arrest him – Carnevale was charged with murder, 
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assault, burglary, and arson.  Only after Carnevale’s 2006 arrest did the government’s key 
evidence develop, in the form of Sean Burns’s testimony.  Burns was a fellow prisoner 
who testified that he befriended Carnevale while they were in jail together awaiting their 
respective trials.  According to Burns, Carnevale broke down and confessed the arson in 
detail after learning that his wife was leaving him.  That claimed confession was the first 
time that any motive for the arson had been suggested, namely that Carnevale had set the 
fire to try to destroy surveillance equipment that might have recorded him stealing 
checks.   
At trial, Burns was the only witness who could decisively tie Carnevale to the 
arson.  There was no physical evidence that survived the fire, nor fingerprints on the 
container of lacquer thinner that investigators believed to be the accelerant used to set the 
fire.  In an attempt to undermine the Commonwealth’s star witness, defense counsel 
emphasized to the jury on cross-examination that Burns was facing two felony firearms 
charges, and that he therefore had an incentive to testify favorably for the prosecution in 
the hopes of receiving lenient treatment himself.  The defense further suggested that 
Burns could have easily fabricated his account from Carnevale’s police reports.  Defense 
counsel also pointed out several inconsistencies between Burns’s account of the arson, as 
supposedly told to him by Carnevale, and the actual physical layout of the crime scene.  
Burns denied receiving any favorable treatment or promises from the prosecution, 
explaining that he was testifying out of a sense of justice for the victims.   
 Although the evidence against Carnevale hinged on a jailhouse informant’s 
essentially uncorroborated testimony, the jury convicted him of all counts.  He was 
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subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment.  Carnevale filed post-trial motions 
requesting a new trial, all of which were denied.1   
While appealing the conviction, the defense discovered two potentially suspicious 
instances of favorable treatment that Burns received after testifying.  First, even though 
Burns had been denied nominal bond just days before Carnevale’s trial, he was granted 
nominal bond almost immediately after the trial.  Second, when Burns ultimately 
accepted a plea deal on his own charges, the government dropped the more serious count 
and recommended a below-guidelines sentence with immediate parole, which Burns 
received.    
As relevant to the case before us, one argument that Carnevale raised on direct 
appeal was that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  In support of that 
claim, Carnevale’s attorney attached documents to his brief demonstrating Burns’s 
favorable bond and sentencing treatment.  Under Pennsylvania law, however, supporting 
documents must be included in the certified record, and simply attaching them to the 
brief is not sufficient to allow their consideration.  As a result, the Superior Court deemed 
the argument to be waived.  The failure to properly file those supporting documents, 
                                              
1 Although the record before us does not include the contents of those motions, the 
Pennsylvania courts on direct and collateral review treated them in a way that suggests 
that Carnevale requested a new trial on the basis that his conviction was based on 
insufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence.  For instance, on direct 
appeal, the Superior Court considered an evidentiary objection waived because not raised 
in a post-trial motion, while it did not consider the sufficiency or weight of the evidence 
challenges so waived.  Subsequently, the state collateral appeals courts considered the 
weight of the evidence claim as if it had been denied by the trial court.  
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which triggered waiver of the weight of the evidence claim, is the basis for Carnevale’s 
present ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
Carnevale first pursued that ineffective assistance of counsel claim in 
Pennsylvania courts pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541, et seq.  He argued, inter alia, that his direct appeals counsel 
had been constitutionally ineffective in forfeiting the weight of the evidence argument.  
The Court of Common Pleas rejected that argument on the grounds that Carnevale 
suffered no prejudice.  The court said that the evidence against Carnevale at trial “was 
strong and supportive” of the verdict, so that “the weight of the evidence claim was itself 
meritless.”  (J.A. 628.)  There was therefore no prejudice to Carnevale because he could 
not show that, “had counsel not caused the claim to be waived, the Superior Court would 
have reversed the judgment of sentence.”  (J.A. 629.)  The court also considered the 
ineffective assistance claim in a different frame – namely, that counsel had been 
ineffective for failing to request a new trial based on after-discovered evidence of a deal 
between Burns and the Commonwealth.  It rejected that version of the claim because the 
documents did not “show any evidence of the supposed ‘deal’ between the 
Commonwealth and Mr. Burns,” so Carnevale would not have been “entitled to relief” 
even had his counsel squarely made the argument and properly filed the documents.  
(J.A. 633.)  The Superior Court subsequently affirmed the Court of Common Pleas’s 
denial of Carnevale’s PCRA petition.  Commonwealth v. Carnevale, No. 866 WDA 2011 
(Pa. Super. Ct. July 20, 2012).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania then denied his 
petition for allowance of appeal.   
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With his state collateral remedies exhausted, Carnevale filed a habeas corpus 
petition in the District Court for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2  He made several 
arguments for relief before the District Court, including the two ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims now before us.  As to those two claims, the District Court agreed with the 
Pennsylvania courts that Carnevale could not establish prejudice based on his direct 
appeals counsel’s supposed ineffectiveness.  The Court ruled that Carnevale “has failed 
to show how review on the merits under direct appeal would have yielded a different 
outcome than the decisions of the jury, the PCRA court, and this Court.”  (J.A. 27.)  
Although the District Court denied Carnevale’s request for a certificate of appealability, 
he appealed that ruling, and we granted a certificate on two issues, namely Carnevale’s 
claims that counsel during the period for filing post-trial motions and on 
direct appeal was ineffective for failing to present after-discovered evidence 
that (1) a prosecution witness falsified his story concerning Appellant’s 
guilt and (2) contrary to his claim at trial, the witness received prosecutorial 
leniency as a result of his testimony. 
 
(J.A. 36.)  We also appointed pro bono counsel.3   
                                              
2 With the consent of Carnevale and the Commonwealth, this case was conducted 
by a magistrate judge in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). 
3 We thank the Federal Practice Clinic of the Duquesne University School of Law 
for their willingness to assist the Court and Mr. Carnevale in this matter, and we 
commend the representation provided. 
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II. Discussion4 
A. Strickland and AEDPA 
Because Carnevale’s claim is that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective 
assistance, he must meet the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984), which has “two components”: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. 
 
As to the deficiency prong, “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of 
reasonably effective assistance.”  Id. at 687.  To satisfy the prejudice prong, Carnevale 
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  In a case 
involving an allegation of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, proving prejudice requires 
the petitioner to “show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable 
failure ..., he would have prevailed on his appeal.”  Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 
(2000). 
 We review ineffective assistance claims like Carnevale’s through the lens of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Under 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  “We review de novo 
whether the District Court appropriately applied [28 U.S.C. § 2254’s] standards of 
review.”  Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 428 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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AEDPA, we do not disturb a legal determination of a state court unless it was “contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or it was “based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding.”  Id. at § 2254(d)(1)-(2).  “Establishing that a state court’s application 
of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is ... difficult.”  Harrington v. Richter, 
562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).  To satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland under the strictures 
of AEDPA, Carnevale must show that it was “unreasonable for the [Pennsylvania courts] 
to conclude [that his] evidence of prejudice fell short of [Strickland’s] standard.”  Id. at 
112.   
 Importantly, a federal court may not grant habeas relief on state law grounds, but 
“only on the ground that [the prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  “[I]t is not the province of a 
federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”  
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).  “[A] state court’s interpretation of state 
law ... binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”  Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 
76 (2005).  Carnevale thus cannot prevail by asking us to second-guess the Pennsylvania 
courts’ state law determinations, and that is what ultimately forecloses his appeal. 
It is not entirely clear to us what theory Carnevale is advancing to show that he 
was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to properly file the documents regarding 
Burns’s bond and plea deal.  For completeness, we will consider both the “weight of the 
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evidence” and the “after-discovered evidence” claims advanced in the PCRA 
proceedings. 
B. Weight of the Evidence 
The first of Carnevale’s ineffective assistance claims is that, by causing the 
Superior Court to treat the weight of the evidence claim as waived, Carnevale’s counsel 
cost him the opportunity to be granted a new trial.  Carnevale faces a heavy burden to 
prove prejudice under Pennsylvania law, however, because a weight of the evidence 
claim only rarely succeeds in reversing a trial court’s decision not to grant a new trial: 
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, 
not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight 
of the evidence.  ...  One of the least assailable reasons for granting or 
denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or 
was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be 
granted in the interest of justice. 
 
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (emphasis added).  Given that 
deferential review, an appellate court should only reverse a trial court’s denial of a new 
trial on weight of the evidence grounds when the “course pursued [by the trial court] 
represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly 
unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is 
a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.”  Id. (quoting Coker v. S.M. Flickinger 
Co., 625 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. 1993)). 
Were we in the jury box at Carnevale’s trial, we very likely would have weighed 
the evidence against him differently than did the actual jury.  And were we the trial court 
reviewing a challenge to the verdict, we would likely have concluded it was against the 
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weight of the evidence.  But we had neither of those roles and cannot assume them now.  
As a federal appellate court acting under AEDPA, we cannot even place ourselves in the 
shoes of a state appellate court and determine whether we would have reversed the trial 
court’s decision not to grant a new trial.  “AEDPA prevents defendants – and federal 
courts – from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the 
reasonable decisions of state courts.”  Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010).  
Accordingly, we evaluate not whether the state court’s opinion “was correct,” but rather 
whether it was unreasonable in applying the Strickland prejudice standard.  Id. (emphasis 
omitted). 
 In this case, during Carnevale’s state PCRA proceedings, both the Court of 
Common Pleas and the Superior Court considered the weight of the evidence claim on 
the merits and determined it to be insufficient to warrant a new trial under Pennsylvania 
law.  The state courts’ determination of state law binds us, Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76, and 
thus establishes for our purposes that Carnevale’s weight of the evidence claim lacked 
merit under Pennsylvania law, even had it been properly presented by appellate counsel.  
That precludes Carnevale from showing that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s 
alleged ineffectiveness, and his Sixth Amendment Strickland claim fails.5  Carnevale 
                                              
5 The District Court rejected the weight of the evidence claim by concluding “that 
the sufficiency of the evidence claim is without merit.”  (J.A. 27.)  That was error 
because, under Pennsylvania law, a sufficiency challenge and a weight challenge are 
“discrete inquiries.”  Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 485 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “A motion for new trial on the grounds that the 
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient 
evidence to sustain the verdict.  Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner [as it would be in a sufficiency 
12 
 
does not show, or even assert, that the Superior Court’s acceptance of the trial court’s 
acceptance of the jury’s verdict runs afoul of some other federal law protection, so he is 
left with no basis for habeas relief.   
C. After-Discovered Evidence 
Carnevale’s argument may also be framed as renewing the after-discovered 
evidence claim he pressed during PCRA review.6  As explained above, the state courts 
rejected that argument because the Burns documents would not have warranted a new 
trial, so there could be no prejudice from a failure to properly raise that claim. 
Under Pennsylvania’s PCRA statute, a petitioner can obtain relief from a 
conviction based on “[t]he unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that 
has subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it 
had been introduced.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(vi).  To obtain such relief,  
Appellant must establish that: (1) the evidence has been discovered after 
trial and it could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through 
reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being 
used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a 
different verdict. 
 
Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 595-96 (Pa. 2007). 
 On PCRA review, the Court of Common Pleas concluded that the Burns 
documents did not constitute after-discovered evidence because they did not show a deal 
between the Commonwealth and Burns tied to his testimony in Carnevale’s trial.  The 
                                                                                                                                                  
challenge].”  Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751 (internal citations omitted).  Applying the proper 
standard, however, we come to the same final conclusion as did the District Court. 
6 The District Court was presented with this argument, but it did not squarely 
address it. 
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Superior Court agreed, and further held that the evidence that did exist “would have been 
used solely to impeach Mr. Burns’[s] credibility, which is an unacceptable use of after-
discovered evidence” under the Washington test.  Commonwealth v. Carnevale, No. 866 
WDA 2011, slip op. at 12-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 20, 2012).  Thus, at the PCRA trial and 
appellate levels, Pennsylvania courts made merits determinations that the documentation 
would not have entitled Carnevale to a new trial, even had it been presented on direct 
appeal. 
 We therefore face once more a state law determination, on the merits, that the 
Burns documents would not have entitled Carnevale to a new trial.  Under AEDPA, we 
are bound by that state court determination on a state law issue.7  Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 
76.  Because that state law ruling rebuts Carnevale’s theory for showing prejudice, we 
cannot say it was unreasonable for the Pennsylvania courts to conclude that Carnevale 
was not prejudiced by the failure to properly make an after-discovered evidence claim.  
Therefore, again, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.8 
                                              
7 Insofar as Carnevale challenges that conclusion, it is through analogy to Grant v. 
Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2013), in which we determined that trial counsel had 
been constitutionally ineffective for failing to “make reasonable efforts to learn that” the 
“Commonwealth’s key witness” “was on parole,” which would have allowed the defense 
to impeach the witness.  But Carnevale’s case is not analogous to Grant, because Burns’s 
pending prosecution was known to defense counsel, and Burns was, in fact, cross-
examined on that basis.  Carnevale’s trial counsel was therefore effective in exactly the 
way that we held trial counsel in Grant was not. 
8 Carnevale also obliquely suggests that the Commonwealth may have concealed 
evidence of a deal with Burns, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
He cites several cases involving Brady claims and states that his “case poses a potential 
violation” of Brady “due to the prosecution’s failure to disclose favorable treatment 
towards the key witness in exchange for testimony against Carnevale ... .” (Reply Br. at 
12 (emphasis added).)  He does not, however, squarely allege a Brady violation, nor do 
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III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying 
Carnevale’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
                                                                                                                                                  
the Burns documents establish that any undisclosed deal existed. We do not consider a 
Brady claim as having been properly raised before us.  Even liberally construing 
Carnevale’s pro se brief before the District Court, it does not make out a Brady claim, 
and the District Court opinion accordingly includes no mention of Brady.  In general, 
“arguments not raised before the District Court are waived on appeal,” DIRECTV Inc. v. 
Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007), a principle even more stringently applied in 
the habeas context where a certificate of appealability is required that “indicate[s] which 
specific issue” is being appealed, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). 
The certificate of appealability also included a second type of claim: that 
Carnevale’s counsel was ineffective for “failing to present after-discovered evidence that 
... a prosecution witness falsified his story concerning [Carnevale’s] guilt ... .”  (J.A. 36.)  
That refers to an affidavit from fellow prisoner David Dixon, who averred that Burns told 
Dixon that he had “fabricated” Carnevale’s confession “to gain favor with the D.A.”  
(J.A. 764.)  We agree with the Commonwealth, however, that Carnevale has waived any 
argument with regard to the Dixon affidavit.  The only mentions of the Dixon affidavit in 
Carnevale’s briefs are cursory references in a pair of footnotes, neither of which makes a 
substantive argument for habeas corpus relief.  “[A]ppellants are required to set forth the 
issues raised on appeal and to present an argument in support of those issues in their 
opening brief. ...  [I]f an appellant fails to comply with these requirements on a particular 
issue, the appellant normally has abandoned and waived that issue on appeal ... .” Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).  Passing reference in a footnote without 
legal argument is insufficient to present an issue.  John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l 
Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997). 
